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Corporate misconduct, whether it be fraud or just not operating consistently with company 
values and mission, has been a consistent topic of conversation in the media and shows no signs 
of abating. From the collapse of Enron in late 2001 (Thomas, 2002) due to the use of accounting 
loopholes to Whole Foods being accused of systematically overcharging customers for pre-
packaged foods in mid-2015 (Gillespie, 2016), the ramifications for participating in corporate 
misconduct can be severe. In the case of Enron, 5,000 employees were fired the day after Enron 
filed for bankruptcy (Paulsen, 2002). Whole Foods is still struggling to regain sales lost due to 
customers taking their business to other establishments (Gillespie, 2016). The government 
responds to corporate misconduct by enacting laws and policies aimed at lessening the chance of 
other organizations engaging in the same type of misconduct. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) Act was passed in July 2002 as a way of establishing governance around accounting 
principles and standardizing the auditing process. Whole Foods, on the other hand, was fined 
nearly $800,000 for their pricing violation (Isidore, 2015). 
With organizations being assessed hefty monetary penalties, one would expect to see a 
decline in instances of major corporate misconduct. However, this is not the case. In 2007, banks 
such as Lehman Brothers and others engaged in excessively risky behavior through subprime
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mortgage lending practices; by 2008 a global financial crisis ensued (Harress & Caulderwood, 2013). 
Lehman Brothers did not survive their involvement in corporate misconduct as the investment 
banking organization crumbled in late 2008. Again, the government intervened and the Dodd-Frank 
regulatory reform was passed and the Basel III capital and liquidity standards were accepted 
worldwide in an effort to reduce the possibilities of this misconduct occurring again. 
 While many incidents of corporate misconduct result in laws and policies being put into place to 
discourage further misconduct, businesses continue to press the envelope. A discussion needs to be 
held around the structure of organizations and what factors encourage and discourage corporate 
misconduct. The resulting discussion could benefit from the participation of both researchers and 
practitioners in understanding the relationship among organizational structures, processes, and 
corporate misconduct. Researchers could expand the current stream of misconduct literature by 
examining antecedents and outcomes that go beyond monetary outcomes to both organization 
processes and the actors within organizations.   
 Practitioners would benefit from a discussion on organizational structure and misconduct in 
several ways. First, practitioners could leverage the knowledge to identify and recognize conditions 
that may incite misconduct. Next, policies and procedures that include training aimed at preventing 
misconduct from occurring could be developed and implemented. Hence, organizations could 
promote cultures that dissuade organizational misconduct from occurring. Finally, practitioners could 
benefit from a discussion around organizational structure and corporate misconduct in that succession 
/ contingency plans can be developed should leadership changes become necessary due to 
misconduct. This preplanning would assist in minimizing the impact of corporate misconduct on 
organizations performance goals. 
Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, and Trevino (2008) suggest that misconduct is not only attributed to 
individuals inside the organization but within the organization itself. This is evident in the fact that 
both Enron and Whole Foods developed a culture where top management allowed misconduct to 
occur, either through direct involvement in the misconduct or by failing to implement procedures that 
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would minimize misconduct. While research examines the actions of individuals who engage in 
misconduct, little research exists on the motivation and actions of top management team (TMT) 
members on minimizing misconduct. Therefore, a deeper understanding of TMTs of organizations as 
it pertains to minimizing misconduct needs to be developed to provide insights on the relationship 
between the motivation of TMT members and corporate misconduct. While research on TMT 
characteristics exists, the examination of TMT characteristics’ influence on misconduct is lacking, 
and the types of misconduct studied has been restricted. 
 Research on misconduct tends to focus on various types of financial misrepresentation because 
these violations are tangible concepts where the consequences from violations are visible (Desai, 
Hogan, & Wilkins, 2006; Devers, Dewett, Michina, & Belsito, 2009; Flanagan, Muse, & 
O’Shaughnessy, 2008; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008). Consequences include reputational damage to 
organizations, boards of directors, or both and the loss of trust of investors and other stakeholders 
(Davidson & Worrell, 1988; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005; Szwajkowski, 1985). Corporate 
misconduct can also affect the employability of members of the organization (Harris & Bromiley, 
2007), as the involvement or association with misconduct could create a stigma around the 
individuals involved in the misconduct. This stigma could result in other organizations electing not to 
consider those involved for career opportunities. Organizational misconduct could also deter 
executives’ willingness to be employed by an organization.   
Fama (1980) posits that it will be challenging for executives to distance themselves from 
successes or failure of the organizations they lead, and such challenges will impact career 
opportunities. Misconduct on a large scale normally results in the termination of senior leaders in the 
organization. Examples include termination of Bernard Ebbers (CEO of WorldCom), Conrad Black 
(CEO of Hollinger International), and Dennis Kozlowski (CEO of Tyco) (Forbes, 2013). While these 
examples of misconduct involve the CEOs of the organizations, studies on corporate misconduct can 
be expanded to include the top management team as well. Expanding the misconduct studies to 
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include other top management team members can provide insights about how top management team 
structure has an impact on corporate misconduct. 
 TMT structures vary from organization to organization. Members of the TMT are typically 
individuals whose titles are president (vice president or senior vice president) or senior executives 
whose title includes “chief” (chief executive office, chief operating office, chief information officer, 
etc.). Executive teams are tasked with overseeing the different areas of responsibility within the 
organization (Menz, 2012; Marcel, 2009; Carmen Díaz-Fernández, Rosario González-Rodríguez, & 
Pawlak, 2014; Canella & Shen, 2001; Hambrick & Canella, 2004). These individuals are responsible 
for the daily operations of their areas and have an obligation to ensure that they create an environment 
that minimizes misconduct. As we examine corporate misconduct, we must take a step back and 
examine possible causes. 
 In order for misconduct to occur, one or all of three factors must be present: opportunity, 
incentive, and rationalization (Chen, Cummings, Hou, & Lee, 2016). While most managers would say 
they behave ethically, situations where both the pressure to achieve and incentives to achieve 
organizational outcomes have been shown to entice members of management to engage in 
misconduct (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Monetary incentives for top management have grown from 
100 to 350 times and in some cases 570 times the compensation for the average employee (Harris & 
Bromiley, 2007). With the pressure and incentives to achieve, one may wonder whether the structure 
of top management teams could impact misconduct. 
 Every member of the TMT is responsible for an area of the business. The chief operations officer 
(COO) generally is responsible for overseeing all facets of daily operations within the organization. 
The value of the COO role in organizations is of interest to researchers. The importance of the COO 
is still subject to conjecture. Some researchers subscribe to the thought that having a COO benefits 
strategic decision making. The COO role is responsible for conveying and implementing 
organizational strategies and allocating resources and resolving business conflicts (Hambrick & 
Canella, 2004), consequently improving organizational performance (March & Simon, 1958; Marcel, 
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2009). Critics of the COO role posit that the existence of a COO adds increased cost to an 
organization and introduces accountability issues by allowing the CEO to escape accountably through 
scapegoating to deflect issues in the organization (Boeker, 1992; Abelson, 1999). While both sets of 
researchers make valid arguments, this study will not focus on the value of the COO position. Instead, 
this study will examine the effects of the COO with regard to minimizing corporate misconduct. 
Specifically, this study will examine whether an expectation of the COO achieving the next level in 
the executive ranks helps bring stability and minimizes corporate misconduct. 
 The COO role in an organization is a unique one. COOs can take on one of two functions. They 
can function as co-leaders in organizations. In this capacity, CEOs have officially surrendered some 
of their leadership duties (Bennett & Miles, 2006), thus creating an environment where the 
experiences and expertise of COOs complement the CEOs (Bass & Stogdill, 1990). This arrangement 
allows the CEO to focus on the complexities of managing the organization and prevents being spread 
too thin, while the COO can focus on the operational decisions that affect the organization (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). The second functional role COOs could assume is that of heir apparent. The heir 
apparent will still have responsibilities for operational decisions of the organization.   
The heir apparent is being groomed to succeed the incumbent CEO.  In this capacity, the heir 
apparent receives intense socialization and engages in decision making regarding the corporate 
strategy for the organization (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002). This allows the heir apparent the ability to 
influence the strategic orientation of the firm. The heir apparent will also begin to get exposure to the 
board of directors. The expectation of the heir apparent to succeed the CEO, coupled with his / her 
exposure to the organizational strategy and knowledge of daily operations should motivate the heir 
apparent to be extremely vigilant in ensuring that no misconduct is occurring in the organization as 
this could jeopardize the possibility of succession to the CEO position. Figure 1 below is the model 





 Given that research regarding the influence of the heir apparent role on corporate misconduct is 
limited, the above model seeks to establish a premise on which to examine the motivation of the heir 
apparent and the resulting effects on misconduct. The control variables for this model are consistent 
with prior research involving the heir apparent position (Marcel, 2009; Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; 
Zhang, 2006; Hill, Kelley, Agle, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Strahan, 1998; Baucus & Near, 1991; 
Walsh, 1995). Each of the independent variables analyses a distinct characteristic of the heir apparent 
role and the corresponding impact the characteristic has on corporate misconduct. Definitions and 
theories used in the model with be discussed in Chapter II. 
Organization of the Dissertation  
 The structure of this dissertation will be as follows. Chapter II imparts a review of the literature 
regarding TMTs and misconduct. This literature review also provides theoretical justification for the 
developed hypotheses. Chapter III discusses the research methods employed to test the hypotheses 
and provides justification for the sample and control variables. The chapter will conclude with an 
explanation of the analysis techniques used in this study. The results of the analysis will be reviewed 
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in Chapter IV. Chapter V concludes the dissertation with a discussion of theoretical and practical 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The characterization and ramifications of the term “misconduct” can be elusive. In this 
chapter misconduct and TMT are discussed in an effort to expound the foundation for which the 
hypotheses in this study are created. 
 Corporate misconduct, whether through fraud or failing to operate consistently with company 
values and missions has frequently been in the media as of late. Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
defines misconduct as intentional wrong doing. While this definition gives a broad spectrum in 
which to define misconduct, a more targeted definition is needed when examining misconduct 
that takes place at the corporate level. For that, the Connelly, Ketchen, Gangloff, and Shook 
(2016, p. 2135) definition for misconduct is employed: “a grievously illegal, unethical, or 
incompetent act (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010), for example deceptive accounting, options 
backdating, employee mistreatment, releasing dangerous products, or environmental offenses.” 
For this study, I adopt this definition for all references to corporate misconduct.  
 The consequences of an organization engaging in corporate misconduct can be severe. 
Misconduct can result in damage to the organization’s brand; dismissal of individuals and 
financial losses to shareholders, employees, customers, and investors (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). 
Additionally, misconduct can introduce additional costs to an organization. Misconduct can result 
in the organization’s incurring fines and legal fees and losing sales (Paine, 1994; Baucus & 
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Baucus,1997; Haugh, 2017). In addition to legal fees and fines, organizations can incur additional 
cost via incentives awarded for business objectives that might have been reached as a result of the 
misconduct. 
Other drawbacks of misconduct include the public perception that misconduct is the norm 
in business. This perception has led the business press to assert that misconduct is the result 
of “system failure” and that as a result extensive reform (mostly regulatory) is needed to 
address the issue (Nocera, 2002). The government has responded to organizational 
misconduct by enacting laws that result in new regulations being introduced. Examples of 
governmental regulations include environmental laws (which resulted from regulatory laws), 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (which resulted from reporting laws), and Occupational Safety and 
Health Rules (which resulted from labor laws) (Small Business Chronicle). These regulations 
cause organizations to enact policies and procedures to avoid the possibility of misconduct 
occurring at their organizations. Organizations regard these additional measures as costly and 
burdensome (Harris & Bromiley, 2007).  
Antecedents to Misconduct 
What leads to misconduct is of interest to researchers and managers. Studies explain a number of 
possible individual, group, and corporate-level reasons for misconduct but have not studied the 
organizational context of corporate misconduct. This research focuses on the organizational context 
and the impact it has on corporate misconduct. 
Research indicates that threats and opportunities from the environment can lead to misconduct. 
When organizations perceive difficulties in reaching performance goals, their leaders may adapt a 
“through any means necessary” mentality, which may lead them to engage in misconduct (Staw & 
Szwajkowski, 1975; Finney & Lesieur, 1982; Vaughn, 1999). However, more recent literature 
indicates that as financial times improve at an organization, individuals are more likely to engage in 
misconduct (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Collins, Uhlenbruck, and 
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Rodriguez (2009) conducted a study with executives in India. The study reveals that executives who 
have social connections with government officials have a greater probability of engaging in 
fraudulent behaviors. Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) examine the paucity-bountiful of organization 
environments as it relates to illegal actions. The study shows as organizations employ greater efforts 
to acquire resources from the environment to achieve organizational outcomes, the chance the 
organization will participate in dubious actions that push the legal limits in an effort of achieving the 
desired outcomes become greater. In that same vein, Vaughan (1999) examines types of misconduct 
and resulting organizational outcomes. Her study shows a connection between environment, 
organization, cognition, and choices when misconduct occurs.   
Along with research on antecedents of corporate misconduct, studies have been conducted on 
why organizations engage in misconduct. Several theories have emerged. Bianchi and Mohliver 
(2016) argue that thriving economic conditions can encourage excessive risk taking. Thriving 
economic conditions can be defined as periods in business when profits increase, access to credit is 
bountiful, there is a surplus of capital, and an organization is able to entice investors with ease (Noe 
& Robello, 1994; Ruckes, 2004; Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005; Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). Results 
indicate that thriving economic times can cause organizations to become less vigilant in enforcing 
policies and procedures that have been put in place to minimize misconduct. On the other hand, 
Harris and Bromiley (2007), extending behavioral theory of the firm, posit that poorly designed top 
management incentives and firm performance goals can be predictors to corporate misconduct. This 
stance takes into account a bounded rationality perspective, which implies that when individuals 
know the incentive for a predetermined outcome, they will behave in such a way as to ensure that the 
predetermined outcome is achieved. Along the same lines, when assessing why firms engage in 
corruption, Collins et al. (2009) provide additional insights that executives who engage in corrupt 
behaviors sometimes justify those behaviors as essential to maintain their business’s competitiveness. 
The Collins et al. (2009) study reinforces the notion that individuals will justify their behaviors while 
attempting to achieve a predetermined outcome, even if the behaviors result in misconduct. 
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To put these research finding into context, let’s examine three examples of corporate misconduct. 
All three examples touch on either antecedents or reasons why misconduct occurred. First, let’s 
examine British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon (Preston, 2010). Under pressure to improve both 
firm performance and corporate culture, then CEO Tony Hayward replaced disgraced outgoing CEO 
Lord John Browne. Under Browne’s tenure as CEO, profits were prioritized over safety, resulting in a 
fire at a refinery that killed 15 people (Walsh, 2010). As Hayward assumed the CEO responsibilities, 
he vowed to change BP’s careless corporate culture and focus on safety. Under Hayward’s leadership, 
cost cutting decisions were made. While the company was profitable, the oil spill of April 2010 
occurred and 4.9 million barrels of oil escaped into the Gulf of Mexico. As a result of BP engaging in 
misconduct, CEO Tony Hayward was removed from his position and the organization was dropped 
from being the second largest oil company to now being the fourth largest, a fall that is the direct 
result of BP selling off its assets to cover expenses related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
Second, the Wells Fargo banking scandal in 2016 is a good example of how financial incentives 
for top managers can lead to corporate misconduct. The organization is accused of setting unrealistic 
sales goals in order for top management to obtain their bonuses. This resulted in employees opening 
two million fake customer accounts. Wells Fargo, which is deemed the gold standard in the banking 
industry due to their history of consistently turning a profit and keeping their expenses low (Corkery, 
Sweet, & Pisani, 2017), developed an aggressive, high-pressure sales culture that resulted in 
management turning a blind eye to unethical behavior, even though the bank had policies against 
sales integrity violations (Egan, 2016 b). Top managers became so focused on obtaining sales goals 
that the organization held daily conference calls at 11:00 a.m., 1:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m., and 5:00 p.m. to 
encourage branch managers to take “any” action necessary to make their sales goals (Egan, 2016 a). 
The actions taken by senior leadership officials at Wells Fargo to meet their goals are consistent with 
the Harris and Bromiley (2007) findings that poorly designed top management incentives and firm 
performance goals can be predictors of corporate misconduct and that rewards for specific outcomes 
increase the probability that individual work toward those outcomes. 
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The third example of corporate misconduct relates to an organization engaging in misconduct to 
ensure that the organization maintained its competitiveness. In 2015, it was revealed that Volkswagen 
had been using software that allowed its vehicles to detect when they were being driven under test 
conditions and report false emission data. An investigation by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) revealed that Volkswagen vehicles were in fact emitting up to 40 times the pollution 
levels reported by test results (Topham, Clarke, Levette, Scruton, & Fidler, 2015). Quality assurance 
leadership was held accountable for the misconduct and subsequently dismissed. The quest to develop 
an in-house solution to their business problem dealing with exhaust from their diesel engines and 
exceed environmental regulations had led to top management approving the installation of the 
deceptive software devices. As a result of Volkswagen’s involvement in misconduct, the organization 
was assessed fines and became the subject of multiple class action lawsuits. Six senior executives 
were indicted for their involvement in the emission scandal (Overly, 2017). 
In the aforementioned examples, financial penalties were imposed on the corporations. In each 
example, the CEO was removed from his duties as well. While CEOs were held accountable, 
decisions regarding operations usually involve TMTs. Consequently, the TMTs were also held 
accountable for the misconduct that took place under their watch. Research shows that the 
information and decision-making process of TMTs is moderated by the TMT members’ backgrounds 
and experiences (see Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus, it is important to understand that the effects of 
incentives, prosperous economic conditions, and confidence that comes with meeting or exceeding 
performance goals may motivate members of the TMT to make decisions that favor participating in 
misconduct (Harris & Bromiley, 2007).   
However, research regarding the relationship between the organization structure of top 
management teams and its impact on corporate misconduct is limited. Current streams of literature 
examine decision-making processes of TMT such as environment and social and emotional cues, but 
do not necessarily research how the structure of the TMT affects ethical decisions and subsequent 
organizational outcomes (Haidt, 2001; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). As a result of this 
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shortfall, little is known about how the context of the top management team structure influences the 
presence or absence of corporate misconduct. This study addresses this shortfall. First, a review of 
TMTs will be covered. Second, characteristics of the TMT and their effects on corporate misconduct 
will be reviewed. Following the discussion of TMT characteristics, perspectives of executives and the 
resulting organizational outcomes will be discussed. Next, specific TMT roles will be examined with 
respect to how those roles could influence misconduct. The chapter will conclude with the 
development of the hypotheses. 
TMT Structure 
 TMT structures and the resulting relationship between TMT members has been examined in 
numerous research studies. However, before discussing the relationships that exist between TMT 
members, a definition of TMT must be established. TMT is defined as members of an organization 
who are at the president level (vice president, senior vice present), officers such as directors, or senior 
executives [chief executive officer (CEO), chief operating officer (COO), chief financial officer 
(CFO), etc.] who have responsibilities for managing one or more areas of the organization (Menz, 
2012; Marcel, 2009; Carmen Díaz-Fernández et al., 2014; Canella & Shen, 2001; Hambrick & 
Canella, 2004). Hambrick’s (2007, p. 334) review of upper echelons theory states, “Leadership of a 
complex organization is a shared activity, and the collective cognitions, capabilities, and interactions 
of the entire TMT enter into strategic behaviors.” Hence, the success of the organization is dependent 
on the TMT’s ability to successfully work together and maintain a quality relationship with the CEO 
(Menz, 2012).   
While each TMT member possesses specific domain knowledge, the combined knowledge of the 
team should supplement that of the CEO (Angwin, Paroutis, & Mitson, 2009; Hambrick & Canella, 
2004; Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Research on the relationship between TMT members and CEOs is 
limited as it relates to misconduct. Studies that have been conducted thus far focus on building 
successful relationships between members of TMTs such as chief information officers (CIOs) or chief 
technology officers (CTOs) and CEOs (Feeny, Edwards, & Simpson, 1992; Gupta, 1991; Johnson & 
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Lederer, 2005; Medcof, 2008; Watson, 1990). However, the studies do not focus on how this 
relationship could impact misconduct occurrence with organizations. More research is needed to gain 
a greater understanding of the relationship between other functional TMT members and CEOs. 
Understanding this relationship could provide insights on how the actions of TMTs effect the 
relationship between TMTs and CEOs and resulting organizational outcomes. 
Research on TMTs has yielded several characteristics that have been shown to influence the 
strategic choices of TMTs. These factors include heterogeneity, tenure, education level, and age of 
the TMT (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and are the backdrop in which upper echelon theory was 
formed. These characteristics have been shown to influence the decision-making processes of TMTs 
(Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995). As TMTs decipher information, the complexity of the 
situation along with risk tolerance will guide their actions (Carpenter, 2002; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Coffee, 1988). Agency theory can be used to describe the possible conflict of interest that may 
develop as the TMT must solve business challenges at hand and meet or exceed organizational goals. 
This potential conflict can cause TMTs (and hence organizations) to engage in corporate misconduct. 
While several characteristic factors have been mentioned, due to the limited scope of this study, only 
TMT heterogeneity and tenure and their impact on corporate misconduct will be discussed. 
Heterogeneity 
 When examining the impact of heterogeneity of the structure of TMTs, the demographic traits of 
groups such as education, tenure at the organization, and functional backgrounds are used as 
substitutes to measure heterogeneity effects on TMTs (Jackson, 1992; Hambrick, 1994). While 
research shows that heterogeneous TMTs have a strong penchant for action (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 
1996), they also exhibit traits of being slower to respond to competitors’ strategies than their 
homogenous counterparts. These findings could explain how the make-up of TMTs impacts corporate 
misconduct since TMTs that are heterogeneous in nature are associated with being innovative and 
willing to take risks. The process can provide an environment where TMTs goes too far in the risks 
they assume and hence engage in corporate misconduct. Nevertheless, one would not expect members 
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of TMTs to engage in misconduct in order to help firms maintain their competitiveness. However, 
heterogeneous teams have been shown to possess stronger skill sets necessary to navigate chaotic 
times in an organization (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). This can be beneficial as TMT members make 
strategic decisions that will impact performance outcomes, but caution should be taken to ensure that 
excessive risk taking does not lead to opportunities for TMTs to engage in misconduct in order to 
reach a specific organizational outcome. While TMT heterogeneity can produce environments that are 
conducive for executives to engage in misconduct due to their propensity to take more aggressive 
risk, other characteristics have been shown to impact TMTs actions that could lead to misconduct. 
Two such characteristics, TMT size and tenure, will be discussed in the next two sections.  
Tenure 
   The research findings on the effects of TMT tenure on organizational misconduct is not 
conclusive. Evidence regarding TMTs with shorter tenures in organizations and their probability to 
participate in misconduct versus their longer tenured counterparts is mostly anecdotal (Williams, 
Fadil, & Armstrong, 2005). Clinard (1983) conducted a study and concludes that less tenured TMT 
members, in an effort to grow their careers quickly, are often more aggressive in the risk they are 
willing to assume. This willingness to assume more risk could result in TMT members engaging in 
misconduct to reach a specific organizational outcome. Less-tenured TMT members may also engage 
in misconduct as they attempt to achieve audacious goals set by more seasoned members of TMTs 
(Clinard & Yeager, 1980). Daboub et al. (1995) suggest that TMT members with long tenures may 
engage in misconduct through acquiescence measures. This was the case in the Wells Fargo customer 
account scandal, where the average tenure of TMT members was 9.6 years (McGegor, 2016). The 
TMT was aware that the organization was experiencing record performance for a firm of that size. No 
one questioned what actions were being taken to achieve the performance goals. As a result, a culture 
emerged to achieve organizational outcomes by any means necessary. This led to the organization 
engaging in the practice of creating fraudulent customer accounts to achieve organizational goals.  
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The actions of the TMT should have been monitored more closely, given that role of the executive 
can influence organizational outcomes.   
Members of the TMT 
 Prior research regarding TMTs focuses mostly on the team as a whole. However, research that 
focuses on individuals within TMT ranks is also needed so that an understanding of individual TMT 
members’ actions and subsequent organizational outcomes can be developed. This study addresses 
that need by first examining four members of TMTs: chief marketing officer (CMO), chief 
technology officer (CTO), chief information officer (CIO), and chief operating officer (COO). These 
four members of TMTs were selected because past research has studied these leadership roles within 
the organizational hierarchy (Aaker, 2008; Nath & Mahajah, 2008; Adler & Ferdows, 1990; 
Applegate & Elam, 1992; Smaltz, Sambamurthy, & Agarwal, 2006; Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; 
Bennett & Miles, 2006). The role of the CFO has been purposely omitted due to the fact that research 
regarding misconduct and CFOs focuses on the financial outcomes as a result of misconduct, and that 
is not the focus of this study. I then narrow my focus to examining a special case of a TMT member – 
the heir apparent. Lastly, this study explores how the motives of the heir apparent impacts 
organizational outcomes.  
Chief Marketing Officers. Within the TMT structure, the position that is referred to as the “voice 
of the customers” is the CMO (McGovern, Quelch, & Crawford, 2004). While CMOs lobby for the 
customers, research shows that organizations who employ a CMO perform no better or worse that 
organizations who elect not to have a CMO (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Given that the empirical 
evidence shows no impact on firm performance, one may ask, what is the significance of a CMO as a 
member of the TMT? The CMO assumes responsibility for “overseeing the marketing business unit, 
managing global marketing resources, developing and supporting the marketing strategies of various 
business units within the organization and directing global marketing efforts, including branding, 
product marketing and customer relationship marketing (Nath & Mahajan, 2008, p. 67). To say it 
another way, CMOs spend their time consulting with top management regarding marketing 
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challenges and facilitating marketing activities designed to develop the divisional-level talent 
(Hopkins & Bailey, 1984). The probability of an organization employing a CMO is greater if the 
organization engages in high degrees of differentiation and innovation (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). 
Chief Technology Officer. Within the TMT, there are two roles that on the surface seem similar: 
CTO and CIO. A closer look at each position will help differentiate them, as well as explain the 
significance of each role in the TMT. First, let’s examine the role of the CTO. CTOs have a wide 
range of duties that spans across products, processes, and information technologies (Alder & 
Ferdows, 1990). Hence, CTOs are responsible for ensuring collaboration between business units and 
researchers to advance technologic efforts for the organization (Jonash, 1996; Tobias, 2000). Stated in 
layman’s terms, CTOs are responsible for, “…avoiding the duplication of technological efforts 
between business units and facilitating technology transfer from one to the other” (Cetindamar & 
Pala, 2011, p. 1032). The CTO role is also tasked with advising the organization on long-term 
technology plans, championing new technology development plans (Kor & Mahoney, 2005), and 
cultivating relationships with external entities such as regulatory agencies and universities (Herstatt, 
Tietze, Nagahira, & Probert, 2007; Smith, 2003). CTOs often collaborate with CMOs in order to 
leverage communication to the media in an effort to shape the technology image for the organization 
(Smith, 2003). 
Chief Information Officers. The CIO is defined as “… the highest-ranking information system 
executive who typically exhibits managerial roles requiring effective communication with top 
management, a broad corporate perspective in managing information resources, influence on 
organizational strategy, responsibility for the planning of information technology (IT) to cope with a 
firm’s competitive environment” (Grover, Jeong, Kettinger, & Lee, 1993, p. 108). The CIO position 
is a unique one within the TMT structure in that most CIOs do not report directly to the CEO 
(Rothfeder & Driscoll, 1990), hence, making the influence of the CIO different from others members 
of the TMT. As such, CIOs are more managerially oriented versus technically oriented (Earl, 1989), 
and their contributions to the organization are realized during the development of the overall 
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organizational strategy (Applegate & Elam, 1992). The CIO role has been shown to have a positive 
impact on organizational outcomes as it relates to information technology decisions (Smaltz et al., 
2006). The CIO’s presence also greatly influences organizational outcomes in the wake of security 
breaches (Zafar, Ko, & Osei-Bryson, 2016). 
Chief Operating Officers. Within the TMT structure, COOs have responsibility for overseeing 
and encouraging employees, dedicating resources to solve business challenges, and sharing and 
implementing the companies’ strategic strategies (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). The way a business 
chooses to define and organize their top leadership roles can affect business outcomes (Jensen & 
Zajac, 2004). Organizations will structure their TMTs based on the standards for their industry. 
Members of TMTs are charged with the responsibility of running specific business units within the 
organization (Menz, 2012). To be successful in their organizations, TMT members are aware that 
they must demonstrate strategic leadership (Applegate & Elam, 1992; Beckman & Burton, 2011). The 
challenges associated with demonstrating strategic leadership stem from the fact that TMT members 
give their attention to the top problems impacting their business areas (Simon & Barnard, 1947). As a 
result of this selective focusing, TMT members are at risk of not being able to effectively monitor 
their business units, thus inadvertently creating an environment where misconduct not only could 
occur but could go undetected for some time. However, there is a position in the TMT that is uniquely 
positioned to deal with the organizational challenges of minimizing misconduct. This position is that 
of the COO.   
The emergence of the COO role in organizations occurred in the 1970s (Barnard, 1968; 
Mintzberg, 1973; Drucker, 1954). Researchers have conflicting views as to the usefulness of the COO 
role (Heenan & Bennis, 1999; Abelson, 1999). Research by Charan and Colvin (1999) posits that 
CEO who are good at their jobs and have effective leadership skills do not need COOs between them 
and the organization. Marcel (2009) argues that the existence of the COO role could influence TMT-
level information processing, which in turn could positively affect firm performance given certain 
environmental conditions. COOs can exercise strategic leadership and leverage their operational 
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knowledge to influence TMT communication and decision making to ensure their organizations reach 
their performance outcomes (Menz, 2012; March & Simon, 1958). The presence of a COO indicates 
that the CEO has delegated some of his / her leadership responsibilities (Bennett & Miles, 2006). The 
presence of a COO could also stem from a combination of the following conditions where the CEO 
has: “(1) Extraordinary task demands arising from industry dynamism, (2) Extraordinary demands 
arising from organizations and/or, (3) Repertoires which limit their capabilities to oversee internal 
operational affairs” (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004, p. 960). COOs are responsible for examining and 
driving day-to-day operational performance outcomes that have a positive impact on firm 
performance (Hambrick & Canella, 2004) while the CEO remains eternally focused on strategies for 
the organization. There are several benefits to having an official COO role. They include having a 
dedicated person to ensure that operational changes are implemented, training and developing the 
next CEO of the organization to ensure a smooth transition of power when the current CEO exits, and 
the ability to leverage the experiences of the COO to supersede the CEO’s normal limitations due to 
bounded rationality (Bass & Stogdill, 1990). These benefits in essence allow CEOs the much-needed 
time to develop strategies to respond to external factors organizations face. 
Caution should be given to having a COO in the leadership hierarchy. This CEO/COO structure is 
not without its share of challenges. Having a COO in an organization adds additional layers of 
bureaucracy, diminishes the efficacy of the CEO, and adds additional cost to the shareholders 
(Marcell, 2009; Judge & Miller, 1991). The cost associated with the extra executive position is 
typically great (Murray, 2000). While it is recognized that not all businesses have the CEO/COO 
leadership structure, this structure has been shown to affect organizational outcomes. Hambrick and 
Cannella, (2004) conducted a study examining CEOs who have COOs and found evidence that the 
CEO/COO leadership structure produces lower performance outcomes than organizations without 
COOs. 
The COO of an organization can assume various responsibilities. They could operate in the role 
of a coleader of the organization, where they share responsibilities running the business. In this 
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capacity, the COO assumes some decision-making authority. COOs could operate in the more 
traditional roll where they are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the 
organization (Bennett & Miles, 2006; Bass & Stogdill, 1990). These duties include monitoring, 
overseeing, and communication with various business units to execute business strategies (Hambrick 
& Canella, 2004). In either role, COOs must be able to efficiently utilize available resources to 
resolve any challenges that may prevent the organization from reaching desired outcomes. The 
COO’s attention should be focused on salient operational decisions and those situations where 
operational misconduct may occur, utilizing organizational resources to implement and monitor 
strategies that ensure “organizational rules” are being adhered to, thus minimizing opportunities for 
misconduct to occur. 
 In addition to the traditional COO. There is a special type of COO. This special type of COO is 
called an “heir apparent.” The heir apparent is also in charge of operational aspects like the COO and 
should also focus on minimizing misconduct; however, the heir apparent has an expectancy of 
achieving the next goal – the CEO position. This should motivate the heir apparent to be hyper-
vigilant in the focus of minimizing misconduct in an effort to remove any obstacles that may prevent 
them from achieving the next step in their career paths.  
Chief Operating Officer Special Case - Heir Apparent 
The presence of a COO in organizations is viewed as a positive thing in the succession literature, 
because the presence of a COO assists an organization in providing order and structure during periods 
of transition (Behn, Riley, & Yang, 2005). Individuals who have the title of COO are regarded as 
being an heir apparent (Vancil, 1987). Research into the value of an heir apparent draws conclusions 
by examining the events of the succession occurring and the resulting firm performance (Johnson, 
Magee, Nagarajan, & Newman, 1985; Worrell, Davidson, Chandy, & Garrison, 1986; Etebari, 
Horrigan, & Lanwehr, 1987). The findings from this research provides insights on how and when 
organizations have CEO succession plans; the smooth transition of power reduces the potential 
negative impacts on firm performance.   
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 Benefits surrounding the usefulness of succession plans has been a topic of research in various 
streams of literature from economics and finance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Parrino & Harris, 
1999), to organization management (Reingahum, 1985; Behn et al., 2005), and strategic management 
literature (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Hambrick & Cannella, 2004), as well as others. The research 
that has been conducted tends to focus on the events that take place during the succession process, the 
resulting performance outcomes as a result of the succession process, or the selection of an insider or 
outsider successor (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992; Wagner, 
Pfeffer, O’Reilly, 1984; Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). These streams of research provide 
useful insights into organizational structure and how organizations handle the transition of power at 
the executive level. However, this body of research does not investigate the relationship between the 
motives of the heir apparent and the effects it has on succession. While succession is not the purpose 
of this study per se, this study will examine how the motivation and subsequent actions of heirs 
apparent affects heirs’ realization of obtaining the next role, which in itself is a succession event.   
Theoretical Framing  
 History of succession influences how people react and what is going to happen in the future. The 
way an organization responds to challenges is a reflection of the current environment. Insights into 
how an organization may respond to challenges can be garnered from past decisions the organization 
has made (Ocasio, 1994). In the case of heirs apparent, heirs can look upon the organization history of 
succession as a way of gaging their chances of becoming CEO. Succession looks at the long-term 
planning regarding leadership of the organization. The history of such succession plans can provide a 
context upon which heirs apparent can base their expectations of becoming CEOs (Expectancy – 
Value Theory; Eccles, Adler, Futterman, Goff, Kaczala, Meece & Midgley, 1983). Literature shows 
that there is a power struggle for the CEO position; thus, there is added motivation for an heir 
apparent to minimize misconduct and give added fervor to that contest from alternative TMT 
members. Since heirs apparent desire to become CEOs, they should be motivated to ensure there are 
no blemishes on their records that should compromise the chances of becoming CEOs given that the 
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succession history of organizations that suggests heirs apparent are promoted to the CEO position. 
Therefore, given the history of COO succession to CEO in the organization, the heir apparent has an 
expectation of assuming the CEO role. 
 Along with the expectancy model of motivation, there is an economic perspective that influences 
heirs’ apparent motivation. That perspective is tournament theory. Tournament theory is defined as a 
situation where the difference in pay is based on rank order instead of individual performance (Lazear 
& Rosen, 1981). It is thought that greater differences in pay influence the amount of effort an 
individual puts forth. This concept relates to heirs apparent because the difference in pay between the 
heir apparent role and the CEO role is one of two factors that will motivate heirs apparent to be 
attentive to organizational outcomes in an effort to diminish the possibility of misconduct occurring. 
As such, the succession history of the organization along with tournament theory can motivate heirs 
apparent as well as creating a level of expectancy that heirs apparent will assume CEO roles if they 
are successful in minimizing misconduct during their tenure. 
Hypothesis Development 
Research to understand what motivates heirs apparent to be successful during their tenure and 
while waiting to become CEO is limited. Heirs apparent are expected to leverage their experiences to 
drive change in the organization, but an in-depth understanding of what motivates heirs apparent is 
needed. Benefits from understanding heir apparent roles will advance TMT literature as it can provide 
another lens into what motivates heirs apparent to perform well and provide insights to the following 
question: Does the expectation of the heir apparent to become CEO create a motivational aspect in 
which the heir apparent minimizes any operational challenges that would be evident in misconduct?   
Since the heir apparent is a special case of the COO position, the heir apparent assumes 
responsibility to focus on making operational decisions that result in the organization reaching its 
intended performance outcomes. If heirs apparent are successful in achieving the desired performance 
outcomes, they then develop an expectancy that their successful performance will result in promotion 
to CEO. Expectancy theory states, “expectancy refers to the perceived likelihood that an action will 
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lead to a particular outcome” (Schmidt, Beck, & Gillespie, 2013, p.318). It can be expected that the 
heir apparent will be hyper focused on operational challenges in an attempt to diminish any situation 
within the organization that could lead to misconduct. After all, any misconduct that occurs during 
heirs’ tenure will be attributed to leadership failure on the part of the heir apparent. Any such failure 
could cast a shadow of doubt on the heir’s ability to successfully manage an organization. This stigma 
could have devastating effects on their future careers.   
Research on stigma finds that it will be difficult for executives to distance themselves from 
successes and/or failures of the organization they manage (Fama, 1980). Thus, if the organizations of 
heirs apparent engage in misconduct, the consequences of the misconduct taking place under the 
heirs’ watch could create a stigma about the heirs, thus negatively affecting the likelihood of their 
assuming the role of CEO. It is understood that the stigma associated with misconduct could have 
negative repercussions for the entire TMT.  However, the focus of this study is heirs apparent. 
Therefore, the potential negative stigma of misconduct as it relates to heirs apparent is the only issue 
of concern.  
Along with minimizing misconduct within the organization, heirs apparent must also ensure that 
the organization is making strides toward achieving performance goals set for the organization.  
Research shows that the presence of an heir apparent has a positive correlation with firm performance 
when evaluating return on assets (ROA) and market-to-book ratio (Marcel, 2009). Successful firm 
performance can lead to performance incentives. These incentives encourage management to continue 
to meet or exceed performance goals. Positive firm performance can benefit heirs apparent beyond 
just receiving incentives. Heir apparent can solidify their chances of becoming CEOs if the 
organization continues to meet or exceed performance expectations. In order for the organization to 
do so, misconduct that could result in regulatory fines and damage to the organizations’ image and 
stakeholders should be minimized (Harris & Bromiley, 2007). 
Ensuring that the organization meets or exceeds performance outcomes while minimizing the 
potential of misconduct occurring can be a taxing task for heirs apparent and CEOs. Heirs apparent 
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willingly take on this challenge because they understand that the prize / reward for successfully 
achieving the goal could result in climbing the corporate ladder. The drive that motivates heirs can 
best be attributed to expectancy theory, which suggests that individuals will act a certain way based 
on the goals they are trying to achieve. Hence H1 is as follows. 
 H1:  The presence of an heir apparent is negatively related to corporate misconduct.  
 Along with misconduct, there are other factors that could influence whether an heir apparent 
expects to succeed to the incumbent CEO. Such factors include whether the current CEO was an heir 
apparent, and whether while heirs apparent they demonstrated positive performance that resulted in 
their promotion to the role of CEO. Bennett and Miles (2006) suggest that the main reason the heir 
apparent role exists is to train an organization’s CEO-elect. An example that supports Bennett and 
Miles’ suggestion is Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, Inc. Cook, along with Steve Jobs (former CEO of 
Apple, Inc.), is credited with developing strategies that improved the overall performance of Apple 
Inc. (Ferracon, 2011). As a result of the positive organizational performance, Cook was promoted to 
the role of CEO upon the resignation of Steve Jobs. Another example is Denise Morrison, CEO of 
Campbell Soup Company. Morrison is credited with launching 50 new products aimed at expanding 
Campbell Soups Company’s appeal to diverse consumers (mainly millennials). Morrison’s success 
resulted in her being promoted to CEO of Campbell Soup Company. 
As stated earlier, the heir apparent has an expectancy to become CEO. This expectancy creates 
the motivation for the heir apparent to be laser-focused on operations and make decisions that will 
result in the successful attainment of organizational goals and the minimization of misconduct. Along 
with the aforementioned motives driving the expectancy of the heir to obtain the CEO position is the 
precedent that can be inferred from the prior heir apparent being promoted to CEO. The succession of 
the former heir apparent to CEO further bolsters the current heir’s expectancy to be promoted to 
CEO.   
Another factor that may influence the heir’s motivation in the pursuit of the CEO role is whether 
the incumbent CEO was an heir apparent. If the incumbent CEO is a former heir apparent, this creates 
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an environment where the current heir apparent can expect to succeed the incumbent CEO barring 
any unforeseen circumstances. By the former heir apparent being promoted to CEO, the organization 
sets a precedent that the heir apparent assumes the CEO role in the succession plan. This precedent 
further motivates heirs to be hyper focused on ensuring that no misconduct occurs during their tenure. 
Therefore, I expect the following. 
H2: The relationship between the presence of an heir apparent and corporate misconduct is 
moderated by prior promotion of an heir apparent such that the negative effect is stronger if 
the current CEO was a prior heir apparent. 
Along with the desire to become CEO, heirs apparent are aware of the monetary changes that 
come with succession to the CEO position. Henderson & Fredrickson, (2001) present a behavior 
perspective on the pay difference that exists between executive levels. They argue that differences in 
pay across positions in an organization are essential to an organization social-psychological and 
sociopolitical context. The pay differences influence whether individuals indulge their own motives 
or whether they contribute to the larger goals of the organization. Research regarding the distribution 
of pay among TMT members and organization profitability shows that the gap in pay among TMT 
members has a positive correlation with organization profitability such that greater gaps in pay create 
greater motivation for TMT members to desire the next level in the organization. It stands to reason 
then an heir apparent who is delivering positive organizational outcomes will be motivated to pursue 
the next level in the organization, especially when that next level has a significant pay increase. 
CEO and heir apparent roles are similar enough that accountability issues arise (Abelson, 1999). 
Tournament theory helps resolve this issue by asserting that as it becomes increasing difficult to 
monitor roles, the large gap in pay reduces the need for monitoring; hence, principle-agent interest 
will better align with organizational goals (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001). With that being said, if 
the heir apparent is successful at minimizing corporate misconduct and maintains or exceeds 
organizational goals, it stands to reason they will have some form of expectancy for the succession 
activities to take place at the end of the incumbent CEO reign.   
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Tournament theory also shows support for the assertion that monetary compensation will impact 
the actions of individuals involved in the tournament. A study of PGA golfers conducted by 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) demonstrates that players’ performance was positively correlated 
with monetary prizes for the golf tournament. The study also finds that the amount of effort put forth 
by the golfers is moderated by the way the monies from the tournament are divvied out. This logic is 
useful when examining the amount of effort, the heir apparent is willing to exert while striving for the 
CEO role in that, based on the heirs’ value of the prize (CEO promotion) and the expectation of 
obtaining the prize, the heirs will exert maximum effort to ensure misconduct is abated. The prize, 
which in this case is an increase in pay, will incentivize heirs to concentrate on ensuring that 
operational goals are met while simultaneously working to curtail misconduct. Those actions are 
influenced by how the individual perceives the connection between the required performance and the 
reward (Vroom & Deci, 1989). Hence, Hypothesis 3 is as follows. 
H3: The relationship between the presence of an heir apparent and corporate misconduct is 
moderated by the gap in pay between the CEO and the heir apparent such that the negative 
effect is stronger as the compensation difference increases. 





















This chapter specifies the methodology used to test the hypotheses that were developed in 
Chapter II. This chapter also gives specific details on the method used to select the sample and 
gather the data as well as providing a description of the variables and discussing the analytical 
methodology used. 
Sample and Data Collection 
 This section explains the methods used to select the population and describes how the data 
will be collected.  
Data  
Initially the population for this study consisted of 153 publicly traded electrical services 
companies (Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] code 4911) listed in COMPUSTAT in 2010. 
However, adjustments were made to the sample because there were only 30 such organizations. 
The adjustments are covered in detail in Chapter IV. Data was collected between the years 2010 
and 2015. Electrical services companies were selected for this study because the utilities and 
power industry is operations driven and highly regulated, and data regarding misconduct 
violations is available. Misconduct violation data was collected from Good Jobs First violation 
tracker. Good Jobs First is a national data set that tracks corporate misconduct violations. The 
organization supports government and corporate responsibility by offering information on 
organizations that receive state and local subsidies.
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Good Job Tracker focuses on being a strategic resource for communities and organizations by 
analyzing and researching companies and industries. Hence, the site tracks various misconduct 
violations in areas such as environment, health, safety, price-fixing, as well as others that are opened 
by 39 federal regulatory agencies as well as the Justice Department (http://www. goodjobsfirst.org/ 
violation-tracker). As with prior research (Marcel, 2009; Zhang, 2006; Cannella & Shen, 2001), 
performance and organizational-level variables were collected. Compustat was used to collect the 
following organizational land performance level variables: firm size, CapEx (variable used to 
measure property, plant, & equipment), shareholder total equity, current total assets, long-term debt, 
sales, and ROA. Executive-level organizational variables extracted from Execucomp include:  CEO 
age, CEO tenure, COO age, and total compensation (for both CEO & COO). 
Measures 
This section identifies the dependent, independent, and control variables used in this dissertation.   
Dependent Variable 
As stated earlier in this study, organizational misconduct is defined as “… a grievously illegal, 
unethical, or incompetent act (Greve et al., 2010), for example, deceptive accounting, options 
backdating, employee mistreatment, releasing dangerous products, or environmental offenses (e.g., 
Govindaraj, Jaggi, & Lin, 2004). Based on this definition, this study will use environmental 
misconduct as the dependent variable. Environmental misconduct will be measured three different 
ways: (1) misconduct occurrence, (2) misconduct count, and (3) the fines assessed for misconduct. By 
measuring the dependent variable three different ways, the overall impact of an organization engaging 
in misconduct can be assessed. The data for the environmental misconduct offenses will be collected 
from Good Jobs First violation tracker. 
Independent Variables.  
Identifying an heir apparent in an organization can be a difficult task. Organizations do not make 
their succession plans public. To counteract this challenge, the Cannella and Shen (2001) definition of 
an heir apparent will be used for this study: “… any officer who was the only person in a firm holding 
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the title of president or of COO or both and who is at least five years younger than the incumbent 
CEO.” The officer’s title and age information was collected via EXECUCOMP, Mergent Online, and 
other publicly available sources. In instances where age information was not available, the data was 
collected via Google search. The presence of an heir apparent will be coded as a categorical variable 
with 1 representing the presence of an heir apparent and 0 otherwise. 
As argued, prior succession events may shape the expectancy of achieving the CEO position for 
executives currently holding the position of heir apparent. Therefore, a variable “Prior Heir Apparent” 
is introduced. The presence of this variable is needed to test Hypothesis 2, which states, “The 
relationship between the presence of a prior heir apparent and corporate misconduct is moderated by 
the promotion of an heir apparent such that the negative effect is stronger if the current CEO is an 
insider.” I measure Prior Heir Apparent as a dichotomous variable indicating a 1 if the incumbent 
CEO was also promoted from an heir apparent position and a 0 otherwise.   
Tournament pay will be measured using the gap in total pay between the CEO and the heir 
apparent. Total pay is defined as cash, long-term, and total compensation (Henderson & Fredrickson, 
2001). Via proxy statements, publicly traded organizations are required to divulge the total 
compensation of their CEOs along with those of the next four highest paid executives. Compensation 
for other members of management is rarely released. As such, the top management team is defined as 
the CEO and the next highest paid executives at an organization (Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1993). 
Therefore, the CEO pay gap will be measured using the natural logarithm of the CEO total pay minus 
the total pay of the heir apparent divided by the CEO total pay listed on the organization’s proxy 
statement (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001). In an effort to diminish heteroscedasticity, the natural 
log will be used in the regression model.  
Control Variables 
While any number of factors could affect organizational misconduct, this study will control for 
the following factors: firm performance and industry. Studies have been conducted that address firm 
performance with regard to the presence of an heir apparent (Marcel, 2009; Charan & Colvin, 1999; 
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Barnett & Davis, 2008; Daily & Johnson, 1997). Keeping with past researchers (Hambrick & 
Cannella, 2004; Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001; Zhang, 2006) ROA will be used to measure firm 
performance. One industry was used in this study as different industries might define operational 
responsibilities differently, thus making it difficult to draw conclusions between the presence of an 
heir apparent and the impact they have on corporate misconduct.   
 In an effort to reduce potentially bias in the results, the following variables will also be controlled 
for in this study.  
Firm Size. On the surface, it may appear that larger firms engage in more misconduct when in 
fact larger organizations are subject to more scrutiny, resulting in more frequent audits by regulatory 
agencies (Asch & Seneca, 1975; Hill et al., 1992) and giving the illusion that larger organizations 
engage in misconduct at greater rates. Therefore, organizational size will be controlled for in this 
study by taking the natural log of the number of employees (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006). 
Risk Management. Organizations inherently take on risk as a way to grow their businesses and 
stay competitive in their industries. To avoid prematurely drawing an assumption that organizational 
risk management predicts an participation in misconduct, debt-to-equity ratio and capital intensity 
will be controlled for. Debt-to-equity ratio will be measured by dividing long-term debt by total assets 
(McTier & Wald, 2011). Capital intensity will be measured by dividing gross property, plant, and 
equipment by total assets (Strahan, 1998).  
Variables that could influence misconduct also need to be controlled for. These variables include 
corporate growth rate, CEO age, and CEO tenure. Industry growth rate could influence the probability 
of an organization engaging in misconduct. As stated earlier, organizations experiencing prosperous 
times have more opportunities to take part in misconduct activities (Bianchi & Mohliver, 2016). 
Therefore, this study will control from industry growth at the four-digit SIC level (Baucus & Near, 
1991).   
The tenure of the CEO position is finite. Henderson and colleagues (2006) argue that as the 
tenure of the CEO grows, the CEO becomes less effective. The CEO can suffer the effects of growing 
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out of touch with external environments, which could impact the CEO’s abilities (Walsh, 1995) and 
influence turnover. Therefore, CEO turnover will be controlled with age and will be measured in 
years. 
Analysis 
The dependent variable for this study will be measured three ways. First, as a dummy variable 
that will account for whether a violation has occurred (1= violation reported, 0= all else). Second, the 
dependent variable will be measured as a count variable (measuring the number of violations that 
occur for each organization). Lastly, the dependent variable will be measured as the value of the fines 
assessed for the violations. Because this data collection will result in a panel data set with a 
dichotomous variable as the outcome of interest, the analysis will be conducted with a fixed effect 
logistic regression model. Multicollinearity will be tested for using the variance inflation factor.   
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a commonly used statistical tool that measures the amount 
of multicollinearity between the independent variables (O’Brien, 2007). VIF values between 0 and 4 
are used to assess the presence of multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). As VIF values approach 4, issues 
of excessive multicollinearity must be addressed. The issue of multicollinearity along with the results 






ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter entails a review of the statistical analysis employed to test the research question 
and the proposed hypotheses in this dissertation. This section will begin by providing a summary 
of how the sample for this study was collected. Next, a review of the analysis performed will be 
discussed. The chapter will conclude with a discussion on the hypothesized relationships that 
were introduced in Chapter II.  
Data Collection 
The sample for this study was comprised of publicly traded electrical services companies 
(SIC Code 4911) that were listed in Compustat in 2010. This classification offered 153 
organizations for this study. Executive compensation for the 153 organizations was gathered 
using Execucomp. Execucomp is a database that houses total compensation information on the 
highest paid executives in organizations. Therefore, any organization that did not have 
compensation information listed in Execucomp was excluded from the study. Of the 153 
organizations listed in Compustat, executive compensation could be found for only 30 firms. 
Therefore, the SIC Codes used was expanded to include: oil, gas, utilities, and power generation 
companies (SIC Codes 1311, 1381, 1382, 1389, 4922, 4923, 4924, and 4931) due to the fact that 
these industries are similar in that all of the listed SIC codes are related to energy. SIC 
classification 13 lists oil and gas extraction organizations and SIC classification 49 lists electric, 
gas, and sanitary services organizations. The resulting sample size was 1,063 
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organizations. Executive compensation data was available for 156 companies. Thus N = 156 
companies. Data for the control variables was collected using information found in both Execucomp 
and Compustat. A Google/LinkedIn search was completed for executive’s biographies to fill in any 
information that was missing from Execucomp and Compustat. 
Analysis 
 Once the sample was defined and the data was collected, a statistical power test was conducted to 
ensure that the sample size was sufficient for the study. Next, the data was tested for multicollinearity. 
Upon successfully determining an appropriate minimal sample size and testing for multicollinearity, a 
fixed effect logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the hypotheses. The results of the tests 
are discussed below.  
Statistical Power  
To ensure this study would be able to accurately identify an interaction between variables, given 
that there is an interaction to identify, the statistical power was calculated using STATA to confirm 
that the sample size (N) was sufficient. Based on the results of Table 1, the sample size of N = 156 is 
sufficient for this study at the α = .05 level.  
Table 1. Statistical Power Calculation Results 
Alpha Power N N1 N2 Delta H Ratio 
0.05 0.6468 50 25 25 0.5 0. 
0.05 0.9037 100 50 50 0.5 0.5 
0.05 0.9766 148 74 74 0.5 0.5 
0.05 0.9955 200 100 100 0.5 0.5 
0.05 0.9992 250 125 125 0.5 0.5 
0.05 1.0000 1,000 500 500 0.5 0.5 
 
Multicollinearity 
 Multicollinearity is described as an instance in which two or more variables are highly correlated 
in a regression model. As a result of this variables being highly correlated, either variable can be used 
when interpreting the effects of the variables on the model. Such conditions adversely affect the 
accuracy of the analysis of each individual variable’s effect on the model. To test for 
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multicollinearity, a widely accepted statistical measure of VIF was used. Given that the VIF for my 
models are below the accepted value of 4 (see Table 2), the issue of multicollinearity does not need to 
be resolved in this model.  
Table 2. VIF Analysis Results 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Capital Intensity 1.37 0.729871 
Firm Size 1.34 0.748199 
Current COO Heir Apparent 1.26 0.791586 
CEO Tenure 1.25 0.799749 
Year 1.22 0.822856 
Tournament Compensation 1.17 0.856123 
ROA 1.11 0.903547 
CEO Age 1.09 0.918669 
Debit to Equity Ratio 1.04 0.962958 
Current CEO Heir Apparent 1.03 0.973703 
Mean VIF 1.19   
 
Descriptive Statistics Results 
The descriptive statistics used to test the relationships of the hypotheses are: misconduct count, 
misconduct penalty amount, misconduct occurrence. The descriptive statistics yielded some 
noteworthy findings. The average penalty amount was $5,860,711, with the maximum fined being 
$5,150,000,000. The mean of the firms that had misconduct was $168,000,000. The large mean stems 
from the fact that there is no set fee for any particular violation. The EPA assesses fines for 
misconduct on a case-by-case basis. Of greater interest are the findings that pay gap seems to be the 
most associated with misconduct in that it is correlated with both misconduct and number of 
occurrences at .184 and .177, respectively. These findings are in line with prior research on 
tournament pay and subsequent behavior. However, given that some level of correlation between the 
variables is expected, future research could prove fruitful in providing additional insights into the 





Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Misconduct Count 0.097 0.488         
2. Misconduct Penalty Amount 5,860,711.000 168,000,000.000 0.069        
3. Misconduct Occurrence 0.055 0.227 0.791 -0.001       
4. Heir Apparent Present 0.165 0.371 0.035 -0.018 0.044      
5. CEO Age 55.699 6.047 0.098 0.014 0.110 0.153     
6. CEO Tenure 7.937 5.666 0.020 -0.006 0.008 0.222 0.191    
7. Pay Gap 6.915 1.408 0.177 0.037 0.184 0.081 0.039 -0.095   
8. ROA -0.090 2.066 0.006 -0.027 0.018 -0.026 -0.009 -0.021 0.214  




Results of Hypotheses Testing 
The hypotheses were tested with three different measures of the dependent variables (DVs): 
misconduct occurrence, number of misconduct violations, and size of the fines assessed for the 
misconduct. The results follow. 
DV – Misconduct Occurrence 
My first analysis focused on whether there were any occurrences of misconduct within a year. 
Thus, the dependent variable was a dummy variable indicating 1 if at least one observation of 
misconduct occurred and a zero otherwise. A logit (Table 4) regression analysis was preformed to test 
the hypothesis. Model 2 tested Hypothesis 1, which states, “The presence of an heir apparent is 
negatively related to corporate misconduct.” Results suggest that the results are in the specified 
direction but do not reach significance. 
Model 3 tested Hypothesis 2, which states, “The relationship between the presence of an heir 
apparent and corporate misconduct is moderated by prior promotion of a current COO heir apparent 
such that the negative effect is stronger if the current CEO heir apparent was a prior heir apparent.” 
The results are in the specified direction but do not reach significance. Model 4 tested Hypothesis 3, 
which states, “The relationship between the presence of a current COO heir apparent and corporate 
misconduct is moderated by the gap in pay between the current CEO heir apparent and the current 
COO heir apparent such that the negative effect is stronger as the compensation difference increases.” 
The results suggest that the results are in the opposite direction of the hypothesis but do not reach 
significance. 
DV – Misconduct Count 
The next analysis (Table 5) focused on reported instances of misconduct within a year. Thus, the 
dependent variable was the count of the number of misconduct incidents reported. A Poisson 
regression analysis was performed to test the hypotheses. Model 2 tested Hypothesis 1. Results 
suggest that the results are in the specified direction but do not reach significance. Model 3 tested 




significance. Model 4 tested Hypothesis 3. The results suggest that the results are in the specified 
direction of the hypothesis but do not reach significance. 
DV – Fines Assessed for Misconduct 
The last analysis (Table 6) focused on the fines that were assessed for occurrences of misconduct 
within one year. Thus, the dependent variable was the monetary amount assessed for misconduct 
occurrences. A Tobit regression analysis was performed to test the hypotheses. Model 2 tested 
Hypothesis 1. Results are in the specified direction but do not reach significance. Model 3 tested 
Hypothesis 2; the results are in the specified direction but do not reach significance. Model 4 tested 
Hypothesis 3; the results are in the opposite direction of the hypothesis but do not reach significance.   
Ad Hoc Analysis 
In keeping with past research and to test the robustness of the results, the three regression 
analyses were also run using the dependent variable as a lagged variable. By conducting the time-
lagged analysis, the hope is to strengthen the assumptions of causality, thus providing greater insights 
into factors that could influence the minimization of corporate misconduct. The results of the time-






Table 4. Results of Analysis for Misconduct Occurrence 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Constant -625.150* -297.515 -635.964* -299.812 -662.138* -303.644 -657.830* -304.500 
Year 0.301* -0.148 0.306* -0.149 0.319* -0.151 0.317* -0.151 
Firm Size 1.163*** -0.348 1.181*** -0.355 1.222*** -0.366 1.186*** -0.359 
ROA 0.376‚Ä† -0.21 0.373‚Ä† -0.21 0.382‚Ä† -0.212 0.377‚Ä† -0.211 
Debit-to-Equity Ratio -0.27 -0.238 -0.272 -0.241 -0.273 -0.241 -0.276 -0.246 
Capital Intensity 1.348* -0.661 1.360* -0.666 1.442* -0.681 1.363* -0.673 
CEO Age 0.107* -0.054 0.110* -0.054 0.107* -0.054 0.109* -0.055 
CEO Tenure -0.037 -0.06 -0.031 -0.061 -0.039 -0.063 -0.037 -0.062 
Heir Apparent Present -0.619 -0.634 -0.644 -0.641 -0.899 -0.704 -0.609 -0.646 
Total Compensation -0.025 -0.175 0.011 -0.177 0.009 -0.177 0.056 -0.147 
Current COO Heir Apparent -0.259 -0.66 -0.608 -0.76 0.629 -1.204 
Current CEO Heir Apparent 1.224 -1.251 
Tournament Compensation             -0.443 -0.516 
Observations 767 767 767 767 
χ2 21.86056** 21.55878* 21.26588* 21.55214*  







Table 5. Results of Analysis for Misconduct Count 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Constant -661.807*** -188.893 -726.063*** -198.369 -723.213*** -198.323 -707.278*** -198.996 
Year 0.323*** -0.094 0.355*** -0.099 0.353*** -0.099 0.346*** -0.099 
Firm Size 0.737*** -0.207 0.792*** -0.215 0.788*** -0.214 0.795*** -0.215 
ROA 0.394‚Ä† -0.209 0.384‚Ä† -0.202 0.390‚Ä† -0.209 0.379‚Ä† -0.202 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio -0.127* -0.058 -0.124* -0.056 -0.125* -0.058 -0.123* -0.056 
Capital Intensity 0.972‚Ä† -0.520 1.003‚Ä† -0.520 0.991‚Ä† -0.514 1.012‚Ä† -0.520 
CEO Age 0.049 -0.030 0.047 -0.031 0.056‚Ä† -0.032 0.048 -0.031 
CEO Tenure 0.013 -0.036 0.034 -0.040 0.031 -0.040 0.037 -0.040 
Heir Apparent Present -0.195 -0.411 -0.276 -0.420 -0.110 -0.451 -0.278 -0.420 
Total Compensation 0.051 -0.100 0.084 -0.104 0.051 -0.111 0.051 -0.116 
Current COO Heir Apparent  -0.406 -0.353 -0.127 -0.448 -0.872 -0.749 
Current CEO Heir Apparent  -0.671 -0.677 
Tournament Compensation            0.236 -0.330 
Observations 767 767 767 767 
χ2 35.4349*** 36.03433*** 36.41298*** 36.73981*** 





Table 6. Results of Analysis for Fines Assessed for Misconduct A 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -5.4e+03** -1971.817 -5.5e+03** -1980.669 -5.5e+03** -1981.518 -5.6e+03** -2002.654 
Year 2.623** -0.979 2.650** -0.983 2.657** -0.983 2.702** -0.994 
Firm Size 7.296*** -2.198 7.360*** -2.217 7.416*** -2.228 7.355*** -2.216 
ROA 1.917 -1.363 1.898 -1.359 1.886 -1.357 1.897 -1.351 
Debit to Equity Ratio -0.743 -0.614 -0.736 -0.612 -0.735 -0.612 -0.735 -0.612 
Capital Intensity 9.454* -4.361 9.470* -4.372 9.597* -4.389 9.452* -4.383 
CEO Age 0.713* -0.348 0.717* -0.349 0.701* -0.351 0.710* -0.350 
CEO Tenure -0.076 -0.369 -0.044 -0.381 -0.053 -0.383 -0.061 -0.384 
Heir Apparent Present -2.789 -4.033 -2.925 -4.064 -3.510 -4.371 -2.803 -4.071 
Total Compensation -0.872 -1.301 -0.626 -1.484 -0.605 -1.477 -0.285 -1.509 
Current COO Heir Apparent -1.391 -4.396 -2.305 -5.039 1.932 -8.034 
Current CEO Heir Apparent 2.878 -7.708 
Tournament Compensation             -1.789 -3.638 
Observations 767 767 767 767 
χ2 22.31202* 22.32551* 22.41528* 22.33479* 
Standard errors in parentheses; Ä† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 









Table 7. Summary of Results 
 Misconduct Occurrence Misconduct Count Fine Assessed for Misconduct 
H1 
Direction but do not reach signifi-
cance and fail to show support for 
Hypothesis 1 
Direction but do not reach 
significance and fail to show 
support for Hypothesis 1 
Results are in specified direction 
but do not reach significance and 
fail to show support for 
Hypothesis 1 
The presence of an heir apparent is 
negatively related to misconduct 
occurrence 
The presence of an heir appar-
ent is negatively related to 
misconduct count 
The presence of an heir apparent 




Direction but do not reach signifi-
cance and fail to show support for 
Hypothesis 2 
Direction but do not reach 
significance and fail to show 
support for Hypothesis 2 
Results are in the opposite 
direction but do not reach 
significance and fail to show 
support for Hypothesis 2 
Current CEO heir apparent does 
not moderate the relationship 
between current heir and 
misconduct occurrence 
Current CEO heir apparent 
does not moderate the 
relationship between current 
heir and misconduct count 
Current CEO heir apparent does 
not moderate the relationship 
between current heir and fine 
assessed 
H3 
Results are in specified direction 
but do not reach significance and 
fail to show support for Hypothesis 
3 
Results are in opposite direc-
tion but do not reach signifi-
cance and fail to show support 
for Hypothesis 3 
Results are in specified direction 
but do not reach significance and 
fail to show support for 
Hypothesis 3 
Tournament compensation does 
not moderate the relationship 
between current heir apparent 
present and misconduct occurrence 
Tournament compensation 
does not moderate the 
relationship between current 
heir present apparent and 
misconduct count 
Tournament compensation does 
not moderate the relationship 
between current heir apparent 






Table 8. Lagged Results of Analysis for Misconduct Occurrence 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Misconduct Occurrence Constant -76.433 (339.570) -175.978 (352.611) -179.226 (355.146) 138.623 (606.773) 
Year 0.028 (0.169) 0.077 (0.176) 0.078 (0.177) -0.078 (0.302) 
Pay Gap 0.973** (0.350) 1.083** (0.376) 1.083** (0.376) 1.357* (0.649) 
ROA 0.262 (0.284) 0.220 (0.298) 0.219 (0.298) -0.470 (1.015) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio -0.258 (0.333) -0.248 (0.349) -0.247 (0.349) -1.183 (1.608) 
Capital Intensity 0.624 (0.816) 0.634 (0.855) 0.636 (0.855) 0.466 (1.573) 
CEO Age 0.141* (0.061) 0.159* (0.066) 0.158* (0.067) 0.127 (0.105) 
CEO Tenure -0.061 (0.068) -0.031 (0.069) -0.031 (0.069) -0.034 (0.097) 
Heir Apparent Present 0.067 (0.660) -0.086 (0.681) -0.106 (0.727) -0.552 (1.154) 
Total Compensation       -1.066 (1.051) 
Current COO Heir Apparent   -1.626* (0.745) -1.659Ä† (0.862) -3.367 (3.328) 
Current CEO Heir Apparent     0.111 (1.485)   
Tournament Compensation       0.914 (1.261) 
Ln Σ2u Constant 2.041*** (0.472) 2.168*** (0.452) 2.164*** (0.456) 1.937Ä† (1.028) 
Observations 641 641 641 260 
χ2 13.05894 14.91287 14.99666 5.406468 





Table 9. Lagged Results of Analysis for Misconduct Count 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Misconduct Count Constant -135.647 (217.548) -204.645 (219.371) -207.471 (220.713) -59.324 (455.467) 
Year 0.060 (0.109) 0.094 (0.110) 0.095 (0.110) 0.021 (0.227) 
Pay Gap 0.651** (0.218) 0.714** (0.219) 0.714** (0.220) 1.053* (0.442) 
ROA 0.296 (0.350) 0.244 (0.307) 0.228 (0.292) 0.080 (0.639) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio -0.100 (0.294) -0.095 (0.283) -0.105 (0.290) -1.196 (1.412) 
Capital Intensity 0.486 (0.570) 0.524 (0.550) 0.538 (0.545) 0.859 (1.024) 
CEO Age 0.131** (0.043) 0.128** (0.042) 0.137** (0.043) 0.140 Ä† (0.077) 
CEO Tenure -0.031 (0.041) -0.006 (0.044) -0.011 (0.044) 0.024 (0.093) 
Heir Apparent Present 0.249 (0.433) 0.115 (0.435) 0.311 (0.462) -0.655 (1.042) 
Total Compensation       -0.382 (0.603) 
Current COO Heir Apparent   -0.527 (0.351) -0.186 (0.430) -3.070 (2.323) 
Current CEO Heir Apparent     -0.905 (0.712)   
Tournament Compensation       1.159 (0.968) 
Ln α Constant 2.061*** (0.341) 1.985*** (0.341) 1.986*** (0.343) 2.377*** (0.636) 
Observations 641 641 641 260 
χ2 24.278 26.888 28.045 11.832 





Table 10. Lagged Results of Analysis for Fines Assessed for MisconductA  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ln Misconduct Amount Constant -1.60E+03 (2,087.851) -2.30E+03 (2,069.359) -2.30E+03 (2,077.954) -519.083 (4,387.913) 
Year 0.748 (1.041) 1.069 (1.031) 1.066 (1.036) 0.203 (2.183) 
Pay Gap 6.722** (2.292) 7.184** (2.316) 7.184** (2.317) 8.092* (4.078) 
ROA 1.479 (1.971) 1.027 (2.028) 1.028 (2.029) -4.641 (6.872) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio -1.549 (2.270) -1.341 (2.311) -1.342 (2.314) -7.246 (10.959) 
Capital Intensity 3.816 (5.422) 3.505 (5.460) 3.501 (5.464) 1.267 (11.474) 
CEO Age 0.980* (0.391) 1.009* (0.394) 1.012* (0.405) 0.517 (0.636) 
CEO Tenure -0.383 (0.409) -0.080 (0.397) -0.080 (0.397) 0.246 (0.681) 
Heir Apparent Present 2.056 (4.083) 0.425 (4.037) 0.461 (4.289) -1.685 (8.173) 
Total Compensation       -4.502 (5.941) 
Current COO Heir Apparent   -10.534* (4.247) -10.469* (4.963) -17.175 (19.957) 
Current CEO Heir Apparent     -0.216 (8.660)   
Tournament Compensation       4.100 (8.157) 
Σu Constant 18.820*** (3.977) 18.706*** (3.890) 18.715*** (3.913) 19.295* (8.019) 
Σe Constant 12.239*** (1.679) 11.824*** (1.615) 11.822*** (1.616) 13.865*** (3.903) 
Observations 641 641 641 260 
χ2 16.468 20.241 20.224 5.356 
Standard errors in parentheses; Ä† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 







DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The topic of corporate misconduct has received a great deal of media attention as of late. 
From the collapse of Enron due to deceptive accounting practices (Thomas, 2002) to Wells Fargo 
engaging in the creation of fraudulent customer accounts and more recently Mylan’s Epipen price 
gouging scandal (Matthews & Heimer, 2016), it appears that interest in organizations engaging in 
corporate misconduct is rising. There has been little research investigating organizational 
structure and what factors incite or deter corporate misconduct. The lack of research attention is 
puzzling given the saliency of the ramifications of misconduct in today’s global business 
environment. This research seeks to understand and begin a conversation regarding what 
motivates members of TMTs, specifically heirs apparent, to minimize corporate misconduct. The 
research question focuses on organization structure and TMT motives to minimize misconduct 
and seeks to complement existing corporate misconduct literature, which has a tendency to focus 
on financial misrepresentation conduct due to the tangibility of the concept (Desai et al., 2006; 
Devers et al., 2009; Flanagan et al., 2008; Karpoff et al., 2008). 
 This study provides evidence that if organizations aim to deter members of the TMT from 
engaging in misconduct, they should focus their efforts on monetary incentives as pay gap was 
found to correlate with levels misconduct. This finding is consistent with prior studies on 
tournament theory, which state the effort an individual exerts will be guided by the prize 




as risky by some. Research indicates that pre-set incentives could also encourage misconduct such as 
the Wells Fargo example (Egan, 2016 b) due to the fact that the bounded rationality perspective 
suggests individuals will operate in such a way to ensure they reach a particular outcome (Harris & 
Bromiley, 2007). This dilemma sets the stage for the next level of conversation regarding TMT 
motivation and organizational misconduct. Organizations need to think through how to balance 
incentivizing desired outcomes without fostering an environment that cultivates misconduct. 
Theoretical Implication 
 This research makes two primary theoretical contributions to the management literature. First, 
this research shifts the corporate misconduct conversation from only focusing on financial 
misconduct to focusing on antecedents of misconduct and not characteristics to misconduct outcomes. 
By expanding the application of Upper Echelon Theory – which posits that executives’ experiences, 
personalities, and values influences their understanding of a situation, thus shaping the way in which 
the executive responses to situation (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) – researchers can gain a better 
understanding of how motivation for a desired result also influences the way in which executives 
respond to situations. This shift in focus can serve as the launching pad for researchers to provide 
meaningful insights as to how to motivate TMT members to act in a way that discourages 
misconduct. 
 The second theoretical implication hinges on bridging the theoretical silos that exist in research 
examining misconduct, ethical leadership, and behavioral theories. Management literature stands to 
benefit from integrating these three areas of theory. When examining corporate misconduct, the 
insights gained from combining these theories could prove more meaningful and prompt an updated 
understanding of how firms build cultures and reputations that are more positive. In addition, 
combining theories could lead to the development of new more integrative theories. This stream of 
research would offer richer insights on the motives of TMTs as they relate to corporate misconduct 






The practical implications of this study lie with organizational reward policy and succession 
planning. As stated earlier in the discussion section, organizations will need to balance the risk of 
rewarding desired outcomes with creating environments that consciously or subconsciously 
encourages misconduct. An option for organizations to consider is the form of payment. Could the 
organization offer other “prizes” that have a monetary value? Organizations can reference misconduct 
literature and develop creative incentive plans that offer more than monetary awards, thus possibly 
reducing motives to participate in misconduct. 
The business setting is transitioning to a global environment, resulting in very complex 
organizational structures. As organizational complexity increases, so does TMT members’ bounded 
rationality. To address this complexity, organizations can leverage succession literature to assist with 
the minimization of misconduct. Succession literature aims to create smooth leadership transitions 
plans as organizations merge and divest businesses and as the opportunity for firms to engage in 
misconduct also increases. Organizations can gain knowledge on ways to develop rewards packages 
that encourage members of TMTs who aspire to become CEOs to make every effort to minimize 
misconduct. 
 The last practical implication hinges on strategic planning in organizations. As organizations 
develop their strategic plans, they can draw upon misconduct literature to enact policies and 
procedures to ensure that they are taking steps to thwart misconduct. The policies and procedures 
should include training that specifically defines misconduct and outlines behaviors that are considered 
misconduct. This will better enable individuals to recognize misconduct and abstain from engaging in 
it (Ashforth et al., 2008). This might also minimize government policies and procedures as a reaction 
to large-scale misconduct. As organizations recognize and gain insights as to antecedents of 





Limitations and Future Research 
 To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to examine organizational structure 
and its influence on corporate misconduct. As such, it was explicitly designed to investigate one role 
within the TMT, heir apparent, and the effects of the motivation to become CEO on corporate 
misconduct. By restricting the study to one specific role, the amount of data was limited. Less than 
50% of organizations across industries have a COO, and even fewer have an heir apparent (Hambrick 
& Cannella, 2004). Thus, it is difficult to generalize the results as data was only available for 5% of 
the firms included in the study. Future research should incorporate multiple industries and investigate 
whether there is a stronger relationship between the presence of an heir apparent and corporate 
misconduct. By expanding industries, studies that separate 2-digit SIC codes as categorical variables 
will allow differences across classification to be observed. For example, separating the oil and gas 
industry from the utilities industry would allow researchers to account for the fact that these industries 
have boards of directors that monitor misconduct and that may influence misconduct outcomes. These 
types of observations could provide meaningful context on the influence of heirs apparent in different 
industries and the resulting impact on corporate misconduct.  
 The definition of misconduct also contributed to the limitations of this study. For this study, 
misconduct was defined as environmental violations assessed to an organization by the EPA. 
Knowing that there are a variety of ways an organization can engage in misconduct, data from 
multiple reporting agencies (OSHA, FDA, ATF, etc.) should be used to compile a more robust data 
set. Including more reporting agencies may allow for greater insights regarding organizational 
structures and systems and corporate misconduct. 
 Future studies should also limit the time frame in which the study is collected to less than five 
years as the average tenure of a CEO is 5.3 years (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 2014). This study 
collected data over a six-year period; if the average CEO tenure is 5.3 years, the presence of an heir 




year time frame, then an heir apparent may not be named until later in the incumbent CEO’s tenure, 
thus impacting the results of the study. 
 Another possible area of research is to look at all of the members of the TMT and explore 
whether there is a relationship between other TMT positions and corporate misconduct even though 
an heir apparent is the “designated” successor of the incumbent CEO. That does not mean that other 
members of the TMT are not vying for the CEO position. This stream of research could prove fruitful 
in explaining whether certain positions within the TMT are more effective in minimizing corporate 
misconduct. 
 An ad hoc analysis testing the regression results using the dependent variable as a lagged variable 
was conducted. The results of the ad hoc analysis were similar to the overall study results and 
accounted for a one-year lag. However, the effects of misconduct may not impact the organization the 
following year. Typically, there is an investigation and recommendations as to the penalties that 
should be assessed to the organization. This process can take between two to three years at a 
minimum. Therefore, future studies should account for a two- to three-year lag in order to capture 
when an organization might actually feel the impact of being caught engaging in misconduct. 
 The final suggestion for future research centers around tournament compensation. Tournament 
compensation suggests that the behavior of individuals is influenced by monetary compensation 
(Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990). This study investigated the linear relationship between the gap in 
pay between CEOs and heirs apparent using tournament compensation as a moderating variable. 
Evidence that a linear relationship exists between this gap in pay and the organization engaging in 
corporate misconduct was shown. However, the correlation between the two variables was not strong. 
Research by Ridge et al., 2015 suggests the relationship between the gap in pay is curvilinear. Future 
research using tournament compensation as a mediating variable versus a moderating variable could 
provide greater insights on the relationship between tournament compensation and misconduct. The 




corporate misconduct and provide guidance on whether corporations can develop systems and 
structures that will make them less likely to engage in corporate misconduct.    
Conclusion 
 This dissertation sought to join the corporate misconduct conversation by investigating the 
influence top management team structure has on corporate misconduct. Specifically, what motivates 
the heir apparent to minimize misconduct? Corporate misconduct literature tends to focus on 
individuals and unethical behavior or corporations that get caught engaging in misconduct verses 
examining the structure and systems of the organization and the impact it has on misconduct. This 
dissertation suggests that the motivation of the heir apparent to become CEO will influence the 
amount of effort exerted by the heir apparent to minimize corporate misconduct within the 
organization. While the hypotheses in this study were not supported, insights into the effects of 
compensation on minimizing misconduct were garnered. Future research building on this research 
should prove fruitful in developing constructs that explain the relationship organizational structure 
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